Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Real Estate as Fodder for an Ode to Intrinsic Valuation

Bloomberg News recently ran a piece titled Chinese Steer Billions Abroad in Quest for Safety. The synopsis: according to New York-based research firm Real Capital Analytics Inc., the six biggest metropolitan areas in the U.S. have attracted $2.88 billion in commercial real estate investment by Chinese companies this year, up nearly 9x from $321 million in all of 2012. All this new capital has propelled some real estate above and beyond even their pre-bubble era prices.

With mortgage interest rates still near historic lows and property prices rising thanks to the gush of foreign money, real estate is feeling like, once again, a tantalizing investment for many people. “What are your thoughts on this?” I’ve been asked a few times recently, notably by folks who live in both L.A. and New York: the top two most targeted geographies for those aforementioned Chinese carrying suitcases full of cash.

Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn, New York, October 2013. Greenland Holding Group Co., the Shanghai-based builder of one of China’s tallest towers, agreed to buy a 70 percent share of the project.

Real estate, like any asset, can be valued in one of two ways: 1.) intrinsically, and 2.) relatively. Intrinsic value is a function of an asset’s cash flow generating power. Relative value is a function of the supply and enthusiasm of other buyers. It should come as no surprise that I am staunchly in the camp of #1.

A quick primer: Real estate generates cash flow through rental income, whether it’s houses or apartments or office buildings or strip malls. Revenue minus expenses equals profit, and that annual profit stream divided by the equity you put down for the real estate is your rate of return. If you put $100,000 down on a $500,000 property and earn an annual income stream of $10,000 after mortgages, taxes, insurance, maintenance, and all other miscellaneous costs, you’re earning a 10% return on your equity. You can adjust the arithmetic if, say, you’re looking at a fixer-upper that is below market prices but requires some work. The bottom line: divide cash in by cash out. It is similar to interest payments you receive from a bond, or a dividend yield you receive from a stock.

Now the question becomes, is that rate of return satisfactory for you? To evaluate, you have to take into consideration the risks involved. Namely, how good is your tenant base, and if you have turnover, how easily will you be able to replace them? If you took a gamble on an older property, how much will it cost for an up-to-date remodel, and more importantly, how confident are you in the estimated costs? There is less risk owning a piece of property in Manhattan where the vacancy rate is 2%, versus owning something out in a desolate suburb hit hard by the subprime bust. Perhaps for the less-risky former, you’d be willing to settle for a 5% return with the possibility of escalating rents in the future. For the much-riskier latter, you may not want to take anything less than a 15% return. At this point it boils down to personal investment goals and your opportunity costs. But this very analysis is the core of intrinsic valuation. Kudos to all who practice this.

Relative valuation, on the other hand, is much simpler. Hey, what did someone pay recently for something similar?

I suppose there’s nothing wrong with relative valuation, provided that the “someone” you’re making comparisons with actually did an intrinsic valuation you can piggyback off of. But herein lies the danger that manifested during the financial crisis. After a while, amidst the feverish buying and flipping, piggybackers end up piggybacking off of each other. Responsible investors actually concerned about intrinsic value couldn’t win a bid and simply left the market. Rates of return turned negative. But who cares, right? I can always flip the property to someone else in six months for 50% more than I paid for it!!

That works… until it doesn’t. We lived through the painful bursting of that phenomenon just a few short years ago. Stunning news: real estate prices do decline. So, the answer to what I think about the re-burgeoning real estate market is: it depends on the intrinsic value of each deal. It may mean doing more work to understand the demographics and economics of the area you’re looking to invest in. It may mean getting outbid by people who don’t care about rates of returns. It may mean watching a property you were outbid on doubling in six months for no apparent reason other than there was someone else willing to pay twice as much for it. Stay steadfast, because, again, relative valuation works until it doesn’t. Once prices depart from a sensible intrinsic value, you’re playing musical chairs. You’re no longer investing, you’re speculating. Speculating can be fun and sometimes profitable, but, like a nagging nun, I feel obligated to remind you that you should only speculate with money you can afford to lose.

However, if you are patient and opportunistic and get your intrinsic valuation right, you won’t care if the music stops and the market crashes. You’ll bank your cash flows and earn your returns regardless of what’s going on. Indeed, you may even hope for a crash then, which would allow you to parlay your cash flows into new investments at fire-sale prices. That has been the simple blueprint of every great real estate investor, nay, every great investor, period, ever. What Ernest Hemingway once wrote about going bankrupt also applies to getting rich in investing: “Gradually, then suddenly.”1

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[1] The original line, in The Sun Also Rises: “How did you go bankrupt? Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.”

Monday, November 11, 2013

The IPO of Twitter: To Buy or Not to Buy

Media coverage of Twitter’s IPO has reached fevered proportions. It is easily the most hyped IPO since Facebook. The question I’ve gotten often lately is: are you going to buy it?

The short answer is no1. Twitter, in my humble opinion, using any conservative method of valuation using publicly available financial figures, is overvalued. By a lot. You may think a Ferrari is a really great car, but would you buy one for $1,000,000 (assuming you can afford it)? Probably not. Price is what you pay, value is what you get.

That seems like an obvious thing to point out, but it gets complicated because 1.) the true intrinsic value a company, especially a rapidly growing tech company like Twitter, is unknown, and 2.) the fractional and liquid nature of stock markets stir gambling instincts like no other. Imagine if the aforementioned Ferrari is a limited edition model, and you can buy and sell 1/100,000th of it for $10 a share with the click of a button. Maybe a small voice deep within you will say, If I can buy this for $10 but sell it for $11 tomorrow, who cares what it’s really worth?

My former professor at NYU Stern, Aswath Damodaran, has taken a stab at estimating the intrinsic value of Twitter and published his thought process here:
http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2013/10/twitter-announces-ipo-valuation.html

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[1] Not even a few shares “just for fun”, which is literally the reason several people have told me with a completely straight face.

It’s long and fairly technical, but I’ll boil it down for you2:

  1. The most important assumption in valuing a rapidly growing company is just how rapid its revenues will grow. Professor Damodaran assumes 55% for the next five years before tapering down to a 2.7% perpetual growth rate by year ten.
  2. Revenues are nice, but as shareholders, we care about profits. Professor Damodaran assumes operating profit margins will increase linearly to 25% over the next ten years.
  3. For companies to grow, they have to reinvest, which will delay the time when shareholders actually get to enjoy the fruits of excess profits. For now, all excess profits are plowed right back into R&D. Professor Damodaran assumes Twitter will have to spend $1.00 to generate $1.50 in new revenues.
  4. All that stuff in #1-3 is risky. What returns might investors demand to take on such a risk? Professor Damodaran assumes 11.22% based on the recent price action of stocks in comparable industries.
  5. Given the above assumptions, Professor Damodaran thinks Twitter is worth $17.36 per share.

That’s pretty much it in a nutshell. Notice that incredible assumptions that must be made, e.g. neck-snapping 55% annual growth, disciplined execution of business operations to generate a high profit margin, and continued innovation to drive such growth into an uncertain future. Out of such rough estimates comes a comically precise number: $17.36.

Before this spirals into a full blown lesson on academic valuation, I’ll stop here and let those who are truly, insatiably curious dig into the link above and/or give me a call where I promise I am happy to nerd out with you to as granular a level as you’d like.

The broad takeaway should be obvious. So much of the value of Twitter is guessing what the future will entail. True – in investing, it’s impossible to not incorporate a guess of the future, but some things are easier to guess than others. For example, it’s easier to assume millions of people will keep buying Coke than to assume Twitter will figure out a way to sell ads effectively and profitably and at scale and won’t be mooched away by future competition. In 1999, people3 happily assumed companies like eToys and Pets.com and Webvan and Amazon would similarly enjoy rocket-powered growth and bid all of them up into multi-billion dollar valuations. Today, only a little over ten years later, only Amazon is left.

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[2] My qualifications, for your edification, are that I got an A and an A- in the two classes I took with Mr. Damodaran.
[3] Really smart, Ivy League educated people getting paid enormous sums of money.

Predicting stuff is really hard. Most of the time, it’s just guessing, especially as you lengthen the duration of your prediction. You want as many handicaps as you can get on your side: amount of cash in the bank; proven revenue model; unconquerable strength of brand; special situations bound by clear catalysts; tangible assets, etc., etc.

Twitter has none of those. Brand strength… maybe. But it’s not “Twitter” the company, per se, that its users are loyal to, it’s the network of people and their followers. Can you be reasonably assured that something cooler won’t catch the fancy of people in the next ten, fifteen years? If you say yes, would you have applied the same argument to MySpace back in 2004?

This is not meant to be a knock on Professor Damodaran’s conclusion of a $17.36 per share fair value. The value of Professor Damodaran’s exercise is the process, not the assumptions. All investors should apply their own assumptions. It’s what makes a market a market. And if you’re reasonably assured of them and your output is $17.36 per share, then you should buy the stock if it’s falls below that price.

It might be a while, though. TWTR traded above $40 on its first day. Now, if you think 55% growth, 25% margins, etc, are aggressive assumptions to achieve a $17.36 fair value, imagine what assumptions you’d have to make to double that. Yeah, exactly. It is highly probable that the current marginal buyer of TWTR is simply gambling. Nothing wrong with that, I suppose, but I’d rather not do that with the money that my clients and I will rely on to retire in the future.
“Remember that just because other people agree or disagree with you doesn’t make you right or wrong – the only thing that matters is the correctness of your analysis and judgment.”
-Charlie Munger

Monday, January 28, 2013

2012 Annual Letter to Investors

Our portfolio gained 16.41% in 2012. Here are our returns since 2009i:

Return
S&P1
Difference
HFRX2
Difference
2009
50.92%
26.46%
24.46%
13.40%
37.52%
2010
18.83%
15.06%
3.77%
5.19%
13.64%
2011
2.28%
2.05%
0.23%
-8.88%
11.16%
2012
16.41%
16.00%
0.41%
3.51%
12.90%
CAGR3
17.06%
14.56%
2.50%
2.99%
14.07%

And here is how $100,000 would have compounded versus those two benchmarks if it was invested at the end of 2008:


Compared to the hedge fund universe at large (HFRX), we have done well. But compared with the S&P, we have done just okay.

As erstwhile Buffett lieutenant David Sokol once said, I am pleased but not satisfied. With the exception of 2009, our investments have tracked the S&P 500 very closely. In fact, one might draw the conclusion that I am “index hugging”. To value investors, including myself, that is a pejorative. So while I am pleased we have not had a down year (yet) and I am pleased we have outperformed the S&P (if only by a slim margin these past few years), I am not satisfied. My goal is to outperform by a bigger margin.

***

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1This is the total return of the S&P 500, including if dividends were reinvested.
2The specific index here is the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index, widely used index to praise or pan hedge funds in the press.
3CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate. Note that our 17.06% return is actually an IRR (explained in footnote 4) from 2009-2012 rather than a simple CAGR, which would have been a more inflated 20.88%.